refactor: aplatir backend/cloud et frontend/cloud

Le niveau `cloud` etait redondant : il ne reste qu'une seule application.

- backend/cloud/* -> backend/*, frontend/cloud/* -> frontend/*
- workspaces npm : frontend et backend ; reference tsconfig ./backend
- extends tsconfig.base corrige (../ au lieu de ../../)
- docker-compose : APP_DIR backend/frontend, montage ./backend/migrations
- deploy.yml : reconstruit aussi l'image migrate
- chemins mis a jour dans les docs, le Makefile et docker/README.md
This commit is contained in:
2026-10-16 11:50:55 +02:00
parent 75da61ac93
commit f564908650
91 changed files with 70 additions and 67 deletions
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import { z } from "zod";
import {
AppError,
attachUser,
clearSessionCookie,
clientIp,
createRateLimiter,
createSession,
currentUser,
hashPassword,
isHttpsRequest,
rateLimitKey,
requireAuth,
revokeSession,
setSessionCookie,
sha256,
verifyPassword,
type App,
type Config,
type Db,
} from "../lib/index.js";
const credentials = z.object({
email: z.string().trim().min(3).max(255),
password: z.string().min(1).max(1024),
});
/**
* Hachage de repli, calcule paresseusement a la premiere echec de connexion.
* Sans lui, un compte inexistant repond plus vite qu'un compte existant, ce qui
* permet d'enumerer les adresses e-mail en mesurant le temps de reponse.
*/
let dummyHash: Promise<string> | undefined;
const decoyHash = (): Promise<string> => (dummyHash ??= hashPassword("aucun-compte-ne-correspond"));
interface UserRow {
id: string;
email: string;
first_name: string;
last_name: string;
password_hash: string;
role_slug: string;
role_name: string;
quota_bytes: number;
used_bytes: number;
max_file_bytes: number;
must_change_password: number;
is_active: number;
}
const publicUser = (row: UserRow) => ({
id: row.id,
email: row.email,
first_name: row.first_name,
last_name: row.last_name,
role_slug: row.role_slug,
role_name: row.role_name,
quota_bytes: row.quota_bytes,
used_bytes: row.used_bytes,
max_file_bytes: row.max_file_bytes,
must_change_password: row.must_change_password === 1,
});
const SELECT_USER = `
SELECT u.id, u.email, u.first_name, u.last_name, u.password_hash,
r.slug AS role_slug, r.name AS role_name,
u.quota_bytes, u.used_bytes, u.max_file_bytes, u.must_change_password, u.is_active
FROM users u
JOIN roles r ON r.id = u.role_id`;
export const registerAuthRoutes = (app: App, db: Db, config: Config): void => {
app.use("/api/cloud/*", attachUser(db));
const limiter = createRateLimiter(config.RATE_LIMIT_LOGIN_MAX, config.RATE_LIMIT_LOGIN_WINDOW_MS);
app.post("/api/cloud/auth/login", async (context) => {
// Borne les tentatives par IP : une attaque par dictionnaire sur un mot de
// passe faible est arretee avant le calcul scrypt, couteux.
const ip = clientIp(context, config.TRUST_PROXY);
if (!limiter.allow(rateLimitKey(ip))) {
throw AppError.unprocessable("Trop de tentatives de connexion. Reessayez dans une minute.");
}
const parsed = credentials.safeParse(await context.req.json().catch(() => null));
if (!parsed.success) throw AppError.badRequest("Identifiants invalides.");
const { email, password } = parsed.data;
const row = await db.one<UserRow>(`${SELECT_USER} WHERE u.active_email = ?`, [email]);
// Meme travail dans les deux cas, pour que le temps de reponse ne
// revele pas si l'adresse existe.
const stored = row && row.is_active === 1 ? row.password_hash : await decoyHash();
if (!row || row.is_active !== 1 || !(await verifyPassword(password, stored))) {
throw AppError.unauthorized("Identifiants invalides.");
}
const forwarded = context.req.header("x-forwarded-for");
const { token, expiresAt } = await createSession(
db,
row.id,
{
ipAddress: config.TRUST_PROXY && forwarded ? forwarded.split(",")[0]?.trim() : null,
userAgent: context.req.header("user-agent"),
},
config.SESSION_TTL_HOURS,
);
await db.exec("UPDATE users SET last_login_at = UTC_TIMESTAMP() WHERE id = ?", [row.id]);
// Le marqueur Secure suit le protocole reellement annonce, pas
// NODE_ENV : un deploiement en HTTP local doit rester utilisable, un
// deploiement https:// ne doit jamais poser de cookie cleartext.
// Le schema reel de la requete, pas PUBLIC_ORIGIN : voir isHttpsRequest.
const secure = isHttpsRequest(context, config.TRUST_PROXY);
setSessionCookie(context, token, expiresAt, secure);
return context.json({ user: publicUser(row) });
});
app.post("/api/cloud/auth/logout", requireAuth, async (context) => {
const token = context.get("token");
if (token) await revokeSession(db, token);
clearSessionCookie(context);
return context.json({ ok: true });
});
app.get("/api/cloud/auth/me", requireAuth, async (context) => {
const session = currentUser(context);
const row = await db.one<UserRow>(`${SELECT_USER} WHERE u.id = ?`, [session.id]);
if (!row) throw AppError.unauthorized();
return context.json({ user: publicUser(row) });
});
const changePassword = z.object({
current: z.string().min(1).max(1024),
next: z.string().min(8).max(1024),
});
/**
* Changement impose a la premiere connexion. Les autres sessions sont
* revoquees : si le compte avait ete ouvert ailleurs, l'ancien mot de passe
* ne doit plus rien ouvrir.
*/
app.post("/api/cloud/auth/change-password", requireAuth, async (context) => {
const session = currentUser(context);
const parsed = changePassword.safeParse(await context.req.json().catch(() => null));
if (!parsed.success) {
throw AppError.badRequest("Le nouveau mot de passe doit contenir au moins 8 caracteres.");
}
const row = await db.one<{ password_hash: string }>(
"SELECT password_hash FROM users WHERE id = ? AND deleted_at IS NULL",
[session.id],
);
if (!row) throw AppError.unauthorized();
if (!(await verifyPassword(parsed.data.current, row.password_hash))) {
throw AppError.unauthorized("Mot de passe actuel incorrect.");
}
if (parsed.data.current === parsed.data.next) {
throw AppError.badRequest("Le nouveau mot de passe doit differer de l'actuel.");
}
const hash = await hashPassword(parsed.data.next);
await db.exec(
`UPDATE users
SET password_hash = ?, must_change_password = 0, password_changed_at = UTC_TIMESTAMP()
WHERE id = ?`,
[hash, session.id],
);
// La session courante est conservee, toutes les autres sont revoquees.
await db.exec(
`UPDATE user_sessions
SET revoked_at = UTC_TIMESTAMP()
WHERE user_id = ? AND revoked_at IS NULL AND token_hash <> ?`,
[session.id, sha256(context.get("token") ?? "")],
);
return context.json({ ok: true });
});
};