refactor: aplatir backend/cloud et frontend/cloud
Le niveau `cloud` etait redondant : il ne reste qu'une seule application. - backend/cloud/* -> backend/*, frontend/cloud/* -> frontend/* - workspaces npm : frontend et backend ; reference tsconfig ./backend - extends tsconfig.base corrige (../ au lieu de ../../) - docker-compose : APP_DIR backend/frontend, montage ./backend/migrations - deploy.yml : reconstruit aussi l'image migrate - chemins mis a jour dans les docs, le Makefile et docker/README.md
This commit is contained in:
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
|
||||
import { z } from "zod";
|
||||
import {
|
||||
AppError,
|
||||
attachUser,
|
||||
clearSessionCookie,
|
||||
clientIp,
|
||||
createRateLimiter,
|
||||
createSession,
|
||||
currentUser,
|
||||
hashPassword,
|
||||
isHttpsRequest,
|
||||
rateLimitKey,
|
||||
requireAuth,
|
||||
revokeSession,
|
||||
setSessionCookie,
|
||||
sha256,
|
||||
verifyPassword,
|
||||
type App,
|
||||
type Config,
|
||||
type Db,
|
||||
} from "../lib/index.js";
|
||||
|
||||
const credentials = z.object({
|
||||
email: z.string().trim().min(3).max(255),
|
||||
password: z.string().min(1).max(1024),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Hachage de repli, calcule paresseusement a la premiere echec de connexion.
|
||||
* Sans lui, un compte inexistant repond plus vite qu'un compte existant, ce qui
|
||||
* permet d'enumerer les adresses e-mail en mesurant le temps de reponse.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
let dummyHash: Promise<string> | undefined;
|
||||
const decoyHash = (): Promise<string> => (dummyHash ??= hashPassword("aucun-compte-ne-correspond"));
|
||||
|
||||
interface UserRow {
|
||||
id: string;
|
||||
email: string;
|
||||
first_name: string;
|
||||
last_name: string;
|
||||
password_hash: string;
|
||||
role_slug: string;
|
||||
role_name: string;
|
||||
quota_bytes: number;
|
||||
used_bytes: number;
|
||||
max_file_bytes: number;
|
||||
must_change_password: number;
|
||||
is_active: number;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const publicUser = (row: UserRow) => ({
|
||||
id: row.id,
|
||||
email: row.email,
|
||||
first_name: row.first_name,
|
||||
last_name: row.last_name,
|
||||
role_slug: row.role_slug,
|
||||
role_name: row.role_name,
|
||||
quota_bytes: row.quota_bytes,
|
||||
used_bytes: row.used_bytes,
|
||||
max_file_bytes: row.max_file_bytes,
|
||||
must_change_password: row.must_change_password === 1,
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const SELECT_USER = `
|
||||
SELECT u.id, u.email, u.first_name, u.last_name, u.password_hash,
|
||||
r.slug AS role_slug, r.name AS role_name,
|
||||
u.quota_bytes, u.used_bytes, u.max_file_bytes, u.must_change_password, u.is_active
|
||||
FROM users u
|
||||
JOIN roles r ON r.id = u.role_id`;
|
||||
|
||||
export const registerAuthRoutes = (app: App, db: Db, config: Config): void => {
|
||||
app.use("/api/cloud/*", attachUser(db));
|
||||
const limiter = createRateLimiter(config.RATE_LIMIT_LOGIN_MAX, config.RATE_LIMIT_LOGIN_WINDOW_MS);
|
||||
|
||||
app.post("/api/cloud/auth/login", async (context) => {
|
||||
// Borne les tentatives par IP : une attaque par dictionnaire sur un mot de
|
||||
// passe faible est arretee avant le calcul scrypt, couteux.
|
||||
const ip = clientIp(context, config.TRUST_PROXY);
|
||||
if (!limiter.allow(rateLimitKey(ip))) {
|
||||
throw AppError.unprocessable("Trop de tentatives de connexion. Reessayez dans une minute.");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const parsed = credentials.safeParse(await context.req.json().catch(() => null));
|
||||
if (!parsed.success) throw AppError.badRequest("Identifiants invalides.");
|
||||
|
||||
const { email, password } = parsed.data;
|
||||
const row = await db.one<UserRow>(`${SELECT_USER} WHERE u.active_email = ?`, [email]);
|
||||
|
||||
// Meme travail dans les deux cas, pour que le temps de reponse ne
|
||||
// revele pas si l'adresse existe.
|
||||
const stored = row && row.is_active === 1 ? row.password_hash : await decoyHash();
|
||||
if (!row || row.is_active !== 1 || !(await verifyPassword(password, stored))) {
|
||||
throw AppError.unauthorized("Identifiants invalides.");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const forwarded = context.req.header("x-forwarded-for");
|
||||
const { token, expiresAt } = await createSession(
|
||||
db,
|
||||
row.id,
|
||||
{
|
||||
ipAddress: config.TRUST_PROXY && forwarded ? forwarded.split(",")[0]?.trim() : null,
|
||||
userAgent: context.req.header("user-agent"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
config.SESSION_TTL_HOURS,
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
await db.exec("UPDATE users SET last_login_at = UTC_TIMESTAMP() WHERE id = ?", [row.id]);
|
||||
// Le marqueur Secure suit le protocole reellement annonce, pas
|
||||
// NODE_ENV : un deploiement en HTTP local doit rester utilisable, un
|
||||
// deploiement https:// ne doit jamais poser de cookie cleartext.
|
||||
// Le schema reel de la requete, pas PUBLIC_ORIGIN : voir isHttpsRequest.
|
||||
const secure = isHttpsRequest(context, config.TRUST_PROXY);
|
||||
setSessionCookie(context, token, expiresAt, secure);
|
||||
|
||||
return context.json({ user: publicUser(row) });
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
app.post("/api/cloud/auth/logout", requireAuth, async (context) => {
|
||||
const token = context.get("token");
|
||||
if (token) await revokeSession(db, token);
|
||||
clearSessionCookie(context);
|
||||
return context.json({ ok: true });
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
app.get("/api/cloud/auth/me", requireAuth, async (context) => {
|
||||
const session = currentUser(context);
|
||||
const row = await db.one<UserRow>(`${SELECT_USER} WHERE u.id = ?`, [session.id]);
|
||||
if (!row) throw AppError.unauthorized();
|
||||
return context.json({ user: publicUser(row) });
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
const changePassword = z.object({
|
||||
current: z.string().min(1).max(1024),
|
||||
next: z.string().min(8).max(1024),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Changement impose a la premiere connexion. Les autres sessions sont
|
||||
* revoquees : si le compte avait ete ouvert ailleurs, l'ancien mot de passe
|
||||
* ne doit plus rien ouvrir.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
app.post("/api/cloud/auth/change-password", requireAuth, async (context) => {
|
||||
const session = currentUser(context);
|
||||
const parsed = changePassword.safeParse(await context.req.json().catch(() => null));
|
||||
if (!parsed.success) {
|
||||
throw AppError.badRequest("Le nouveau mot de passe doit contenir au moins 8 caracteres.");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const row = await db.one<{ password_hash: string }>(
|
||||
"SELECT password_hash FROM users WHERE id = ? AND deleted_at IS NULL",
|
||||
[session.id],
|
||||
);
|
||||
if (!row) throw AppError.unauthorized();
|
||||
|
||||
if (!(await verifyPassword(parsed.data.current, row.password_hash))) {
|
||||
throw AppError.unauthorized("Mot de passe actuel incorrect.");
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (parsed.data.current === parsed.data.next) {
|
||||
throw AppError.badRequest("Le nouveau mot de passe doit differer de l'actuel.");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const hash = await hashPassword(parsed.data.next);
|
||||
await db.exec(
|
||||
`UPDATE users
|
||||
SET password_hash = ?, must_change_password = 0, password_changed_at = UTC_TIMESTAMP()
|
||||
WHERE id = ?`,
|
||||
[hash, session.id],
|
||||
);
|
||||
// La session courante est conservee, toutes les autres sont revoquees.
|
||||
await db.exec(
|
||||
`UPDATE user_sessions
|
||||
SET revoked_at = UTC_TIMESTAMP()
|
||||
WHERE user_id = ? AND revoked_at IS NULL AND token_hash <> ?`,
|
||||
[session.id, sha256(context.get("token") ?? "")],
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
return context.json({ ok: true });
|
||||
});
|
||||
};
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user